Episode 17 of NTSB News Talk brings together an unusually rich set of accidents and safety insights, all centered on pilot decision-making, trim system failures, swept-wing stall risks, and the ongoing challenge of hand-flying in IMC when automation misbehaves. In this week’s discussion, hosts Ma...
Episode 17 of NTSB News Talk brings together an unusually rich set of accidents and safety insights, all centered on pilot decision-making, trim system failures, swept-wing stall risks, and the ongoing challenge of hand-flying in IMC when automation misbehaves. In this week’s discussion, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark use recent NTSB reports to highlight the mistakes, mechanical failures, and chain-of-events that continue to trap even experienced pilots. For listeners who fly IFR, rely on autopilots, or operate aircraft with electric pitch trim, this episode offers lessons that are immediately relevant.
The episode opens on an encouraging note. Max reports that the United States saw three CAPS parachute deployments in three days—Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. These weren’t all Cirrus aircraft, either; one was N163BR, a Lancair Turbine LX7, one of the fastest experimental turbine singles in the fleet. All three incidents involved engine failures on approach, and every person involved walked away uninjured. For Max and Rob, it’s another sign that whole-airframe parachutes continue to save lives and will become increasingly common as the general aviation fleet modernizes.
But the tone shifts as the hosts examine the crash of N30HG, a King Air B100 on a humanitarian mission to Jamaica following Hurricane Melissa. Shortly after takeoff from Florida, the aircraft descended rapidly and struck palm trees before crashing into a pond, killing both on board. A similar King Air pilot’s Facebook account of a pitch trim runaway and violent pitch-down event becomes an important point of comparison. While the NTSB has not yet identified the cause, the parallels highlight how aggressive and unexpected trim-related events can be—and how essential it is for pilots to know exactly where the trim and autopilot disconnects are located, especially when operating older turbine aircraft.
In the next case, XA-JMR, a Mexican registered Hawker 800XP fatal accident near Battle Creek, Michigan, post-maintenance work required a swept-wing stall test. The Hawker had been down for seven months while technicians inspected the wing’s leading edges for corrosion. Manufacturer guidance requires that a qualified test pilot perform the post-maintenance stall series. But when the crew was unable to schedule one, they elected to fly the test themselves. Moments after entering the test area at 15,000 feet, the crew transmitted in Spanish that they had stalled the aircraft and were attempting to recover—an attempt that ultimately failed. For Rob, a veteran swept-wing pilot, the lesson is clear: pilots must say “no” when a task exceeds their experience or training, especially in high-AOA testing where swept-wing handling characteristics are unforgiving.
The episode then examines several loss-of-control accidents during IFR operations. N9627X, a Cessna 210 bound for Jonesboro, Arkansas deviated around convective weather, then began a series of inexplicable turns and large speed changes before crashing in heavy IMC. A separate Cirrus SR22 accident in Louisiana involved a pilot who reported autopilot issues during a go-around, then lost control while hand-flying. Both accidents reinforce how quickly pilots can become disoriented when hand-flying after automation confusion—especially in turbulence or low visibility.
The hosts next highlight a